Democracy isn’t inherently permanent.

That fact—clearly linked to growing concerns about human rights and democracy in the United States—is on the minds of more than a few FVC readers.

We recently asked readers for their questions about how our federal government functions, and many people asked about what, if any, safeguards exist to protect our own democracy and rights.

The questions get to the very heart of Canada’s Parliamentary democracy and constitution, so we have taken time to explain them as best we can, with insight from UBC political science professor Stewart Prest.

Two readers wanted to know what would need to happen if Canada wanted to leave the Commonwealth (as an example) or become a state in the United States.

No. Although there is an exception.

Canada’s constitution is extremely difficult to change. The 1982 Constitution Act created Canada’s constitution as we know it today, including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Before 1982, the British government needed to confirm any changes to Canada’s constitution. Since 1982, the Canadian constitution—and thus the Canadian government—exists completely separate from the UK. Because it brought to Canada all the laws that govern our country, this is known as the “Patriation” of the constitution.

(That includes our monarch. Although we have the same physical monarch as the UK, the position is fully separate. King Charles is King of Canada and his actions in that role are entirely Canadian.)

A government cannot unilaterally change Canada’s constitution.

An amendment formula within the constitution sets a high bar for changing the document. Any changes must be ratified by the legislatures of at least seven provinces (territories aren’t included) which, together, make up at least half of all the provinces’ population. That last bit is huge. It means that, today, any constitutional change would require the agreement of seven different governments in provinces with a combined 20 million people.

Some changes are so important that they require the agreement of all provinces. Such alterations would include changes to the monarchy, the composition of the Supreme Court, the “use of English or French”—and changes to how the constitution itself can be amended.

History shows that political considerations make it harder to get the agreement of provinces than one might expect—and probably, harder than the people who drafted the constitution knew at the time.

In the decade after the Constitution Act was passed, the governing Progressive Conservatives tried and failed twice to amend the constitution. The 1987 Meech Lake Accord, which attempted to change the amending formula, had widespread support from the provinces when it was first announced. Actually ratifying the document in each provincial legislature takes time—and growing opposition to the Accord in several provinces led to the agreement falling apart. Its demise was blamed for reigniting Quebec’s sovereignty movement.

In 1992, a second attempt at amending the constitution resulted in the Charlottetown Accord. Again, a tentative agreement was struck. This time, a cross-country referendum was held. And most Canadians voted to reject the agreement. The death of the Charlottetown Accord was seen as a major factor in the Progressive Conservatives’ historic 1993 defeat by the Liberals, who promised not to re-open the constitution. No government since has attempted to amend the constitution.

All that said, a sitting government does have one way to unilaterally influence the application of the constitution, if not the constitution itself. The constitution’s Section 33 allows a government to override certain freedoms and rights contained within the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is called the “notwithstanding clause.”

Use of the clause has historically been seen as politically risky. This election, Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre has said he may use the clause to override court rulings regarding the sentencing of convicted criminals. Some have suggested that doing so risks setting a dangerous precedent and reducing the protections of the Charter as a whole.

The notwithstanding clause cannot be used to override democratic or language rights. Invoking the clause only lasts for five years, after which it must be renewed.

So no, whoever is elected this month cannot unilaterally decide to cede Canada to the Americans.

Canada, of course, won't remain the same way forever. But unless a foreign state invades us, at this point in our history there is no quick way a government might cede Canadian territory to a foreign nation. The question of Quebec sovereignty and previous attempts to change the constitution have led to laws and precedents that will influence how any future border alterations could occur.

A referendum would almost certainly be necessary, both politically and legally. Provincial and territorial governments would also likely need to ratify such a monumental change. All those moves would be preceded by months—or likely years—of debate and negotiations. Even a referendum wouldn’t be an end point. As with the case with Quebec sovereignty, a referendum would likely be needed just to begin negotiations. A second referendum would probably be needed to actually ratify any deal. And as we will see later, the political danger of triggering such a conversation itself poses a significant obstruction.

The government could choose to leave the Commonwealth, if it wanted to do so. The Commonwealth is an international organization, like the UN, and Canada’s participation in it would fall under the government’s ability to shape foreign affairs. Because of the repatriation of the constitution, the commonwealth—and our relationship with the UK—is not fundamental to the status of Canada as an independent country nor the laws that govern the nation.

(Leaving the Commonwealth would not abolish the monarchy or end Parliamentary democracy. Similarly, abolishing the monarchy would not necessarily entail leaving the Commonwealth. King Charles III is the head of the Commonwealth; but he’s only King of 15 of the organization’s 56 states.)

You can find one expert’s thoughts on how Canada could abolish the monarchy, if it chose to do so, here.

We had two very similar questions on the safeguards that exist to prevent Canada from becoming a fascist, authoritarian, or oligarchic state.

This is a complex question because it goes to the core of our notions of democracy, and the rules that govern our country.

But, for this thought experiment, let’s assume that an authoritarian, anti-democratic fascist party won a majority in Parliament, and that that party embarked on a policy agenda to end democracy and override Canadian rights and freedoms.

Canada’s Parliamentary system gives a governing party significant power. While a US president is often limited in his powers by Congress and the Senate, a Canadian Prime Minister typically has both executive and governing power. (You can read more about that in our Canadian Government 101 explainer here.) But that power is not unlimited.

There are four key limiting factors. At the centre of most of those factors is the fact that, at any time they choose to do so, an elected body of the people’s representatives (the House of Commons) can remove the Prime Minister.

First, the constitution and the courts require a government to abide by certain laws and preserve a wide range of rights and freedoms. Some of those can be overridden by the use of the notwithstanding clause. But as noted above, the notwithstanding clause cannot be used to override democratic rights—i.e. the fundamentals of democratic government and the ability of the people to elect a new government.

Second, Canada still has a Senate, and it must approve all new legislation. The Senate can highlight potential problems with bills and suggest changes. It has rarely blocked new laws and almost always accommodates the wishes of the government of the day—eventually.

That’s by design. The Principle of Responsible Government means that the House of Commons—the house that would be controlled by a newly elected government—reflects the will of the people and thus should not be stopped by an unelected body.

UBC Professor Stewart Prest says that principle limits the Senate. “We don't look to Senate to step in, in any kind of emergency role, to rein in the Prime Minister; that's the job of the House of Commons.”

But the Senate still has power. The Senate’s members are appointed and can serve until they reach the age of 75. The appointment process can be controversial and change according to the whims of the government of the day. But it generally means that a new incoming government must work with a Senate full of members selected by previous Prime Ministers to accomplish its goals in a timely manner. The Senate may not block legislation, but it can obstruct and delay laws and act as a general nuisance. By doing so—and doing so in a public way—it can highlight the potential ramifications of new laws and create political problems for the government proposing them.

Third, there are the provinces. Canada’s federal government is not its only government. The feds have responsibility over only some of the institutions that govern our land. The provinces are in charge of many critical services—and provide some of the logistical manpower the feds need to turn policy and laws into action.

Much of the power of Canada’s federal government comes from its pocketbook. Provinces, for example, are in charge of health care, but receive federal money to provide services in line with the Canada Health Act. Provinces are also in charge of most policing issues, as well as court systems that administer justice and apply criminal laws (which are created by the feds). As with the constitution, the federal government needs the co-operation of the provinces to exercise its power.

Fourth and finally, there is the people and democracy. This is the flip side of the Principle of Responsible Government. “Responsible Government” doesn’t mean acting in a responsible manner. It means that the government is “responsible to the people.” In other words, the government must reflect the people’s will. As noted above, a government cannot use the notwithstanding clause to end elections. A government must subject itself to elections at least every five years.

Critically, and unlike the US presidency, a Prime Minister can lose their job at any time if a majority of MPs—the representatives of the Canadian people—lose confidence in them.

Although Canadian members of Parliament have rarely shown much desire to challenge their own parties, majority governments that become extremely unpopular tend to fracture.

This system is a Parliamentary democracy’s superpower. A Prime Minister might be considered to have more power than an American president because they control government’s legislative arm (the House of Commons). But that legislative body can also choose to eject the Prime Minister at any moment, whereas a President has four years of almost guaranteed power. (Impeachment is possible but has a very high threshold, as history has shown.)

“It becomes a much faster and more effective check on authority and authoritarianism, by extension, than the presidential system,” Prest said. “In a presidential system, you can have someone with those [authoritarian] proclivities and they’re there for the next four years and it’s difficult if not impossible to remove them. Whereas in a Parliamentary system, all it takes is for a majority of MPs to decide the wind is blowing in the other direction and decline to support that government.”

The power of the people is always present in a democracy. There is no way to create a democratic system that can entirely prevent the people from electing a government of their choosing, even if that government itself is anti-democratic. But governments, even avowedly democratic ones, can limit—or enhance—the ability of people to hold their elected officials to account. Governments and politicians can increase or restrict the public’s ability to connect with their representatives, access information about governmental actions, and use their voice to promote changes. Rules, norms and public behaviours regarding individual rights, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and voting laws and expectations, and the nature of public and political discourse all contribute to the ability of a public to hold their government accountable.

The government plays a key role in all of those areas. But so too do individual voters.

Two people asked what mechanisms Canada has to remove politicians who "aren't doing their job."

Specific, and relatively new, recall legislation empowers people in British Columbia and Alberta to force local or provincial politicians out of office or to subject themselves to a new election.

At the federal level, there is no recall legislation that empowers voters to directly “fire” a Member of Parliament. However, as discussed above and in our Government 101 explainer, there are ways that those MPs, as a collective, can fire the government of the day. As individuals, voters don’t have a direct say in that process, but can influence the decisions and behaviours of politicians through political advocacy and action.

As for that recall legislation:

British Columbia and Alberta both have rules that spell out how a politician can be ousted if enough residents sign a petition. But the threshold to trigger a by-election is so high that petitions almost always fail.

Alberta introduced recall legislation in 2021 that applied not only to members of the legislature, but also municipalities. Several recall petitions were launched, but none succeeded. Some people have suggested that residents are weaponizing recall legislation against mayors they oppose on policy grounds. (BC’s recall legislation does not apply to municipalities.

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